Klinsmann's 5 years at the helm of US Soccer was ultimately a huge disappointment, especially in light of his success at Germany. Given his experience and his intimate knowledge of soccer in the US, he had as good of a chance as anyone from the world stage to be successful here. However, we soon saw glimpses of his shortcomings as a tactical coach as well as a player manager, which both manifested in its fullness in last week's 2-1 loss in Colombus and the 4-0 shellacking in Costa Rica.
2011-12
In 2011, Klinsmann immediately promised a proactive and attacking style of play. He tried his hand at a 4-3-3 during those first two years. However, his 3 midfielders would be Bradley, Edu and JJ (or Danny Williams / Beckerman), which is problematic since none are known for their offensive playmaking ability. Remember that one of the main criticisms of Bob Bradley was his usage of 2 defensive-minded midfielders and no attacking central mid threats (known as the empty bucket formation). Yet, here was Klinsmann deploying 3 of those players. In the penultimate WC qualifying round, that formation yielded just 1 win in the 3 matches, necessitating a change to... you know... more than 3 attacking players.
2013
Right before the start of the Hex, Klinsmann unceremoniously and publicly dumped captain Bocanegra, who never played for the US again, from the starting lineup the night before a road Concacaf game. It was a shock to everyone and displayed a lack of emotional intelligence from Klinsmann as he disrespected the leader in front of the team. A very green Omar Gonzalez was given a surprise start and of course we lost that match due to a typical Omar gaffe. Why Klinsmann would leave his most reliable central defender out of his starting lineup before a Concacaf road qualifier is already a head-scratcher, but doing it in such a public manner to the captain shows mind-blowingly awful judgment. (Little did we know what would happen a year later!)
Its no surprise then that there was locker-room unrest in the month to follow as results dipped,
2014
Klinsmann dropped Donovan, the greatest US player of all-time, right before the WC because of a personal vendetta. Instead, he brought along the following 3 players: Brad Davis, Chris Wondoloski and an already-injured Aron Johannsson. Landon went on to lead the Galaxy to a MLS Cup that year, while Brad Davis was unsurprisingly invisible and unusable vs Germany, an internationally-unqualified and inexperienced Wondolowski crumbled in the most important moment of his life and Aron was too hurt to contribute. Not bringing Landon was a fireable offense and Gulati should have immediately replaced Klinsmann with Landon on the Brazil-bound plane.
In the send-off games just prior to the World Cup, Klinsmann decided to deploy and practice a 4-4-2 diamond formation, one that the US hadn't been using. That he decides to try untested formations in big moments perhaps tells you about his lack of judgement and tactical inabilities. Though we're not sure if it was a disagreement over tactics or perhaps personnel, Klinsmann's #2, Martin Vazquez, left the team right before the WC.
Klinsmann had no back-up plan for Jozy Altidore's injury in the WC. None. Instead he moved Dempsey and Bradley out of position and essentially made us worse in 3 positions (Forward, attacking mid, central mid). For a coach who had spoken glowingly about proactive soccer, Klinsmann's team ended up with the lowest possession percentage and fewest shots per game of any US WC team ever (in the modern era, since there were no stats in the 1950 or before). This is not a strong tactical mind.
But perhaps the most damaging and untalked about decision of all - he moved Michael Bradley to the #10 spot, the attacking/playmaking central midfield spot. Anybody who knows anything about soccer can plainly see that Bradley is far far better coming from a deeper position. Instead of searching for and trying out the creative midfield talent pool the last 2 years, Klinsmann wasted Bradley's prime years as well as the opportunity for US Soccer's growth by playing him out of position for so long.
Did I mention that Brad Davis actually started vs Germany in a WC? Yes. yes he did.
2015
Klinsmann made news in 2015 January camp complaining that some of his players were not fit, as if that was the reason we're not a soccer power. Among others, Besler objected and was subsequently blacklisted for much of the year. That led to the following CB pairing in the summer's Gold Cup: a-still-too-green John Brooks and a gosh-awful Ventura Alvarado (who promptly fell off the face of the earth). It was obvious to all that Cameron and Besler were the best pairing and Klinsmann's awful lineup choices contributed to a historically bad 4th place finish. That is a fireable offense. Bob Bradley was fired for losing a 2-0 lead in the Golf Cup final in 2011. Klinsmann finished FOURTH. It was the first time since 2003 that the US didn't make the final. Worse yet, the US had the fewest shots of all 12 teams in the tournament during the group stage. We couldn't even muster up a proper offense in our own region.
He subsequently lost the Concacaf Cup vs Mexico in embarrassing fashion - we couldn't hold possession in most of the game. Again, Bob Bradley lost his job in a loss to Mexico at the same venue even though he held a 2-0 lead at one point. Klinsmann's team lost the GC and this region championship, marking the worst year in his US tenure up to that point. To make things worse, he publicly chastised the only Champions League player on our squad for asking out of the game due to a possible injury. Just another example of Klinsmann throwing players under the bus after big losses.
2016
As the US continued this cycle's penultimate qualifying round, Klinsmann's team lost to Guatemala for the first time since 1988. They were the lowest ranked team (95th) to ever beat the US. In that game, Klinsmann had started Mix Diskerud as the defensive mid. Mix was one of the only truly creative midfielders, but he was used out of position in typical Klinsmann fashion. Before the next game, Zusi was called in and inserted directly into the starting lineup. I don't have an issue with Zusi starting in itself, but I do have a problem with the fact that Klinsmann deemed him not good enough to come into camp, but then he starts immediately ahead of Nagbe, Nguyen and Finlay, who were in camp all along. How can you run a team like that? The team is at best, confused.
We start the first game of the Copa America in a formation we haven't played in years - a 4-3-3. We lose.
This is the same tournament where Klinsmann started Chris Wondolowski in the semifinal vs Argenetina of this international tournament. Yes, yes he did. Wondo might be good in the box in an MLS game, but what value does he have when we won't have the ball and our only chance is to counterattack in the open field? Hmm, a speedster like Jordan Morris perhaps?
At our Columbus fortress where we've won 2-0 four straight times, Klinsmann decided to get cute and came out in a 3-5-2 formation that we have not played perhaps ever, including 3 CENTERBACKS. The formational unfamiliarity on the field led to confusion as well as Mexico's first goal. Could have been worse with 2 other shots off the woodwork. It was abandoned after less than half an hour, but the damage was done.
Then our 4-0 rout at the hands of Costa Rica was the worst shutout loss in a qualifier since 1957. We lost consecutive WC qualifiers for the first time since 2001. Every single respectable news outlet called for his firing.
Big picture:
We were out-shot 292-169 in the last 3 tournaments and the Concacaf Cup.
We haven't beat a top 10 team in 6 tries under Klinsmann (0-5-1).
He wasted Bradley for 2 of his prime years (WC to May 2016) while not developing any #10s (creative, offensive midfielders).
And he destroyed our only true identity - we no longer have a disciplined and tough defense.
Ultimately, we are worse than where we where 5 years ago. Sigh.
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